The article examines how four states in the francophone Sahel have managed Salafi activity since independence. States that established institutional oversight mechanisms in the Islamic sphere prior to the emergence of Saudi Arabia as a global exporter of Salafi ideology have effectively counteracted the rise of political and jihadi Salafism in recent decades. Autocratic incumbents created national Islamic associations, determined the leadership makeup of these, and delegated state authority to non-Salafi leaders so as to regulate access to the Islamic sphere. The tacit cooperation arrangements between state and nonstate actors enabled the former to demobilize religious challengers. States that chose strategies other than institutional regulation contributed to the rise of political and security challengers. These findings challenge conventional assumptions about the inability of weak states to regulate their religious spheres and shed new light on the complex relationship between weak states and Islam.
The academic accounts of Islamic reform in Niger have focused on the Izala movement, reducing it to an anti-Sufism. When these representations stress the wahhabi-salafi tendency of this movement, not only Izala appears as the Sufi foe, it is also viewed as a brand of Islamic discourse of foreign origin. This article shows that these accounts have told only part of the genealogy of Izala. References to Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio’s 19th century jihad are pervasive in Izala discourse despite the fact that he was affiliated with the Qadiriyya Sufi order. Dan Fodi’s acts, deeds and ideas are consistently read as Izala moments. The evidence presented is based on the pronouncements made by two Izala organizations. Both illustrate how the Izala reform has continuously appropriated and reinvented the legacy of Usman Dan Fodio, recasting this historical figure as the “true” Sunni and the Sheikh of the Sunna. Theoretically, what is at stake here is not so much how Izala operates, but how accounts of this movement have relied on a dichotomy Sufi/Anti-Sufi which contributes to rigidify our categories and therefore handicap our conceptual apparatus. In this sense, while highlighting how Usman Dan Fodio has become a “lieu de memoire”, this article seeks to shed some light on the genealogy of this Islamic reform discourse, and interrogate the categories used to characterize it. What the Izala appropriation of Usman Dan Fodio achieves is not so much a call to redefine Izala, as a readjustment of our conceptual map, which seeks to make sense of this movement.
Nach einer kürzen Überblick über dan Staat (Teil I), folgt einer detaillierte Untersuchung der Provinz Gobir (Teil II und III). Der Verfasser beschäftigt sich dabei mit zwei Fragestellungen: wie verlaufen die Beziehungen zwischen staatlicher Verwaltung und Bauern? Wie wird den Bauern eine autonome Agrarkultur von einer islamisch-urbanen Kultur abgelöst? Bei der erste Frage konzentriert er seine Untersuchung auf die unterste Ebene, bei der Verwaltung und Bauern in unmittelbaren Kontakt zueinander treten. Die Herrschenden kommen dabei nur soweit ins Blickfeld, als sie auf den Bauern unmittelbar einwirken. Alle Angaben beziehen sich auf der Zeit vor dem Militärputsch (15.4.1947). Ebenfalls nicht berücksichtigt sind die heute weit wichtigeren Uran-Exporte. 6 Anhänge: Feldforschung - Hausa-Glossar - Preislieder - Das Budget von Bauernhaushalten - Das ökonomische System der Heiratsgeschenke - Die Kommerzialisierung des Bodens.
After World War II administrative reports in the Air region of the Niger colony (today's Niger Republic) mention a 'new' brotherhood, Khalwatiyya, which competes successfully with the long-established Qadiriyya. The khalwati shaykh Malam Mu sa Abatul maintains that his way has been introduced in Air by a ioth-century scholar and 'saint', Si Mahmud al-Baghdadi, and transmitted up to him through a regular silsila. Khalwatiyya, rather than Qadiriyya (and even more than Sanusiyya), could well be considered as the 'national' tariqa of Air. It is in fact far more likely that it was introduced or, at least, reactivated by Malam Mu sa, in order to strengthen the influence of the southern, sedentary ineslemen (members of the religious fractions) as against the northern warlike fractions, especially the Kunta. This is evidenced by the stress put upon gardening, modem European-style education and generai policy of co-operation with the French, after the failure of Kawsan's (Kaocen) uprising of 1916-17. The rise of the Khalwatiyya would thus resuit more from a manipulation than from a restauration.
The jihadist groups that have laid waste to the Sahel over the past decade are creeping along the southern borders of Mali and Burkina Faso. How far south will they go? Without making a moral equivalence between the past and the present, this short essay discusses how historical, cultural and political factors could shape the new geography of armed conflict in the region. It suggests that the southern expansion of jihadist groups will ultimately depend on the timely and appropriate set of initiatives taken by coastal countries.
Recent developments in Niger have shown a growing presence of Islamic symbols in the public space in civil society organizations, and within government and political circles. The case under consideration here is the reform in 2004 that required magistrates presiding over electoral commissions to take an oath according to their religious conviction. For most of these civil servants the law meant being sworn in on the Qur'an, but the initiative resulted in a controversy between different factions: civil society organizations seeking to preserve the secular nature of state institutions; and state officials and political parties who argued that the law would contribute to free and fair electoral processes. Putting this controversy in a broader context, I suggest looking at the genealogy of the instrumentalization of the Qur'an in Niger's sociopolitical history, and also the identity politics to which state officials are increasingly compelled to respond. I also argue that the provision for religious symbolism in a state system which, until now has claimed its secularity, is dictated by a political utilitarianism focusing on the need for new compulsory rituals, and translates into an accommodationism that plays with the religious identity of the administration. In emphasizing the new functionality, meanings and symbolic value of Islam in general, and the Qur'an in particular, the paper highlights the complexity of the management of the line of demarcation between the religious and the secular in the light of recent constitutional and legal changes in Niger.
Au lendemain de l'indépendance du Niger, l'organisation judiciaire y a été fixée par une loi le 16 mars 1962. Cette loi a défini les domaines de la loi et de la coutume et fait une large place au statut personnel des citoyens. Le pays étant islamisé a plus de 90%, la loi coranique jouera un grand rôle dans la distribution de la justice. La philosophie du droit nigérien et son originalité résident en une symbiose des droits moderne, coutumier et religieux, dans un Etat proclamé laïc. L'auteur examine les aspects des juridictions et l'application du droit.
This article discusses youth religiosities and how young Salafi (Sunnance) appropriate the discourse of the popularization of the Sunna and at the same time distance themselves from the well-known Izala movement. The Sunnance have become a social formation only recently, but have earnestly and regularly taken the stage to lay the ground for a new expression and understanding of the Izala reform agenda. They claim to be Izala though they have consistently taken theological positions and promoted practices that challenge and break with Izala “orthodoxy.” These developments, the article argues, are the manifestation of the Izala effect, an intra and inter-Muslim dynamic that is gradually reshaping both anti-Sufism dear to Salafism and Sufi practices. The article is based on ethnographic materials collected in Niger over the last four years among youth promoters of a religious life in line with the “Pious Ancestors.”
Is there a specifically Islamic vision of the body? Given the nuanced nature of cultural understandings of the body and Islam's own variable expressions, this question is probably unanswerable, and indeed poorly phrased. Phrased another way, however, the question of the relationship between Islam and the body becomes more interesting: how do bodily practices in different Muslim societies articulate with different versions of lived Islam? My research among Arabs in remote northwestern Niger on the aesthetic of corpulent female bodies, and the practice of forcefeeding young girls to achieve it, speaks to this issue.
Cet essai revient sur la question de l'islam contemporain dans ses rapports multiples à la modernité en Afrique. Il expose quelques éléments d'analyse des dynamiques de réforme de l'islam dans un contexte africain à partir des années 1990. Il prend les récents développements relatifs aux religiosités musulmanes au Niger comme objet de réflexion et s'interroge sur les habits théoriques et les catégories conceptuelles qui nous servent à comprendre ce phénomène social, politique, mais aussi philosophique. Voici un essai de théorisation des dynamiques africaines contemporaines.
Les auteurs de cet ouvrage, spécialistes du fait religieux ou islamique en Afrique de l'Ouest, d'origines et de générations différentes, proposent une série de relectures en islam subsaharien. Les évolutions en cours modifient progressivement les repères mis en place par la littérature scientifique des cinquante dernières années et obligent à une remise en chantier des analyses. Trois pays ont été choisis comme témoins privilégiés de l'évolution de la question musulmane en Afrique de l'Ouest : le Sénégal, le Niger et le Nigeria, qui, par leur histoire, représentent de véritables laboratoires en matière d'islam. Dans l'Afrique d'aujourd'hui, nulle part la séparation entre le politique et le religieux n'est jugée acceptable. Nul État de droit n'est jugé possible s'il n'est consacré par la sharî'a du côté musulman, et par la référence à la Bible du côté évangélique et pentecôtiste. L'islam prend donc toute sa place dans ces réveils religieux en chaîne, qui constituent sans doute, de façon paradoxale pour le spécialistes de sciences sociales, un mode d'accès imprévu à la modernité.