It can be observed that jihadist groups in West Africa are increasingly expanding their areas of activity from the Sahel to the coastal countries along the Gulf of Guinea for some time now. Especially from Burkina Faso, where entire regions are already outside state control, these actors are advancing further and further south.
This current development is the focus of the new study "La nouvelle frontière des groupes djihadistes", which the KAS Regional Programme Political Dialogue West Africa (PDWA) has implemented together with partner Promédiation. One of the study's key topics is the importance of national parks in border regions, which are increasingly used by jihadist groups as strategic retreat and activity areas and whose local resources are used for financing.
This article is based on the results of a qualitative doctoral research study conducted with 124 Muslims living in Djougou at the time of the survey, ranging in age from 15 to 60 years. The commune of Djougou in Benin is composed of a large majority of Muslims whose identity and social behaviors are determined by Islamic norms. Conducted between 2017 and 2020, and based on ethnographic observation data and individual semi-directed interviews, this research aims to understand the dynamics of Islamic plurality in the commune of Djougou. Thus, a "logbook" and an interview guide are used for data collection. The different data collected allowed us to determine that the Tijaniyya and Sunni branch of Islam are the most visible and practiced branches of Islam in the commune of Djougou. The actors of anti-innovation in Islam are called "people of the Sunna" and claim to be practitioners of "true" Islam, unlike the practitioners of confreres (Tijaniyya, Ahmadiyya) and Shi'ism.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the money market is one of the most important components of the banking institution. This article proposes viable Islamic money market instruments from the experience of Malaysia and Nigeria for the nascent Islamic banking institution in the Republic of Benin. The money market is the mechanism for the management of the required liquid asset and statutory reserves in the banking system. It serves the purpose of the maintenance of minimum liquidity ratio and statutory reserve that represents the daily requirement of the banking institution. It is how the Central Bank passes monetary policies to the subordinate banks. The role of the money market in the banking system as a keeper of liquid assets rate it above other branches of the financial market. The proposal is derived from the experience of Malaysia, which is a leading Islamic banking jurisdiction, and Nigeria, which is a relatively new African Islamic finance regime. The study adopts a qualitative method.
On January 8, voters in Benin went to the polls to select the new Parliament. The overall turnout was not particularly high at 38.66 percent, but it was still higher than the last parliamentary election held in 2019, where only 23 percent of the country voted. This number was low in part due to opposition parties boycotting the election. Four out of the seven parties that ran for this most recent election failed to clear the national 10 percent threshold. The two parties linked to President Patrice Talon, the Progressive Union for Renewal (Union Progressiste pour le Renouveau, or UPR) and the Republican Bloc (Bloc Républicain, or BR) obtained 37 percent and 29 percent of the vote, respectively. The main opposition party, the Democrats (Les Démocrates), whose current honorary president is Thomas Boni Yayi—Benin’s president from 2006 to 2016—entered the parliament with 24 percent of the vote. Out of 109 seats, the movement behind the incumbent president obtained 81 seats, in contrast with the opposition’s 28 (ORTB, January 12).
This report by guest contributor Dr. Leif Brottem uses ACLED data and primary information collected by Dr. Brottem and his team during research in northern Benin.
Les autorités du Bénin et du Togo doivent veiller à ce que les droits humains soient respectés dans le cadre de la lutte contre les groupes armés, a déclaré Amnesty International le 27 juillet alors que des informations font état d’arrestations et détentions arbitraires et de violations des droits à la liberté de réunion pacifique et d’expression, et alors que le président Emmanuel Macron effectue une visite au Bénin les 27 et 28 juillet 2022.
L’apparition de la démocratie au Bénin a favorisé l’émergence des élitesreligieuses et traditionnelles sur la scène publique. Ces dernières ont saisil’opportunité que leur offraient les changements institutionnels au niveau de l’Étatpour s’organiser en groupes d’intérêts et essayer d’améliorer leur situation sociale.Mais leurs ambitions vont bien au-delà de leurs sphères de prédilection, car cesélites religieuses et traditionnelles entendent être associées à l’élaboration despolitiques publiques et participer au développement de l’État béninois. Ce souhaitmet en exergue la probabilité de l’existence d’une gouvernance conjointe ouplurielle, à échelons différents, de la cité, notamment au niveau local, entre élitespolitiques, religieuses et traditionnelles. D’autre part, si la position de l’Étatbéninois à l’endroit des chefferies religieuses et traditionnelles a varié depuis laproclamation de l’indépendance et qu’il leur est reconnu une certaine importance,le statut de ces institutions sociales n’est toujours pas éclairci. Il n’en demeure pasmoins que les gouvernements et les élites politiques au Bénin peuvent avoir uneconception instrumentale de ces relations. Par ailleurs, les élites religieuses ettraditionnelles ne restent pas passives face à l’action de l’État et des élitespolitiques. Aux questions de savoir quand, où et comment ces élites politiques,religieuses et traditionnelles se rencontrent, il peut y avoir plusieurs modalités deréponses qui entraînent à leur tour certaines configurations relationnelles non sansconséquences sur l’État béninois.
Livre I. - Le bas Dahomey (Le milieu - La communauté isla-mique -) (p. 1-52) Livre II. - Le haut Dahomey (Le milieu - les groupements ethiques - les collectivités et individualités islamiques - Le droit coutumier - Les institutions sociales - Croyances animistes et pratiques médico-magiques) (p. 153-272) Conclusions (p. 272-273) Annexes (1-12, p. 276-291) Bibliographie (Annexe 12, p. 291).
Le Borgou a été très tôt traversé par les pistes du commerce ouest-africain de longue distance. A partir des histoires de famille de commerçants et des traditions orales des griots confrontées aux sources écrites concernant l'Afrique occidentale, l'auteur retrace les migrations des Wangara, marchands de l'or, du sel, de la kola et des esclaves, et la manière dont s'est construite leur identité collective.
This text explore the forms of a religious pluralism abounding in South-Benin and its manifestations in an urban and frontier area crossed by many cultural influences. The contacts between vodun, Islam and Christianity are bound to the urban development for the last three centuries. In the last few decades, one attends a phenomenal flourishing of new churches in the urban area, dominated in number by the prophetic and Pentecostal movements. The absence of a political instrumentalisation of the religious identities is not doubtless alone to explain the durable and peaceful cohabitation between churches. The civil peace constitutes well the main economic resource of the Benin and politicians are used to protect it.
This article deals with the life story of a reformist Islamic scholar, el Hadj Ibrahim Habib, who was appointed imam of the Zongo Mosque in Cotonou by his father, the sheikh of the Tijaniyyah Sufi order. This young imam has developed new tools of communication and has built a very dynamic organization around him. His mosque has become the center of reformist Islam in the southern part of the Republic of Benin, and members of the da’wa have been strongly involved in Islamic associations. El Hadj Habib, who had lived outside the country for a long time, came to be “reconnected” over the last fifteen years before becoming an important local notable. The complexity of the Islamic landscape in Cotonou cannot be reduced to a dichotomy between Sufi tradition and reformist Islam. As such, El Hadj Habib is a good example of possible links between Sufism and reformism, which have been found in other parts of the continent.
In Benin, the general furor surrounding the 2019 legislative elections held without opposition parties caused many to overlook the fact that Ibrahim Ousmane, a wellknown imam from Cotonou, was ultimately elected to the National Assembly. His decision to run in the elections had sparked intense debates over political participation, the criteria used to select the community’s “legitimate” representatives, and, more broadly, the nature of Islamic religious authority in a minority context. In this article, I use the controversy that erupted in 2019 as a starting point for exploring disputes within Benin’s Muslim community and the dilemmas of Muslim minority politics. These disputes center on how its members can engage with national politics to promote their collective interests and maintain their political autonomy from the state. The crisis can also be understood in terms of a “generational” struggle for religious authority, in a context where there are competing sources of legitimacy.
Le Dahomey, couloir de 670 kilomètres de long sur 200 de large, coïncé entre le Togo et l’immense Nigeria, est un des pays du golfe de Guinée les plus anciennement connus.
La côte est basse, bordée de lagunes, tandis que la zone centrale est formée de plateaux et de monts isolés; la partie septentrionale, enfin, est plus élevée, prise en écharpe par les monts de l’Atacora, culminant jusqu’aux environs de 800 mètres. Dans le Sud particulièrement, l’hygrométrie est forte et la température à peu près constante, bien qu’il y ait double saison des pluies et double saison sèche.
La population du D…
In recent years, jihadist groups have gradually shifted from northern Mali toward the centre of the country and then Burkina Faso. An acceleration occurred in 2018, with an increase in incidents in the south-west and flares of violence east of Burkina Faso, raising fears of spreading to Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin. Contrary to the discourse on an external threat and the resilience of the brotherhoods, while dozens of nationals of the Gulf Guinea countries have joined jihadist groups in recent years, West Africa’s coastal States have their backs against the wall in the attempt to develop and implement responses to stem the spread of jihadism, starting by learning from the experiences of their Sahelian neighbours.
Sahelian militant Islamist groups are threatening border areas of littoral states where grievances held by pastoralist communities may provide an entry point for extremist interests.
Faced with jihadist breakthrough in Burkina Faso, neighbouring states in West Africa's Gulf of Guinea increasingly fear attacks in their own territories. These countries should improve intelligence sharing, strengthen border controls and regain the trust of local populations.
Insurgents have established bases in an important nature reserve spanning parts of Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger. They pose a growing danger to local ecosystems and people living around the park. The three countries need to collaborate more closely to keep the threat at bay.
Le paysage religieux du Bénin est formé de trois grandes religions: la religion vodoun, le christianisme et l'islam. Depuis l'avènement de la démocratie en 1990, on note le retour en force des religions sur la scène publique. Pour se rendre visibles dans la société, les trois religions utilisent les moyens suivants: la restauration et la prolifération des lieux de culte, l'organisation de manifestations publiques, les médias et la réalisation des oeuvres sociales (écoles, centres de santé, les orphelinats...).