In the village of Todiam, persons accused of a fault come by far to take an oath in the mosque. This ordalic procedure utilizes actors, codes and principles which invite to analyze this oath by regarding it as a /test/ in the sense of pragmatic sociology. From this point of view, and by confronting the speeches to the practice, one questions the conditions of legitimacy and effectiveness of this juratory test, its possible misappropriations and its performatif effects on the social life.
In this paper I examine the re-Islamisation of French-speaking Muslims in Burkina Faso. Grounded in direct observation carried out with a group involved in Islamic evening classes, my analysis interrogates the logics which have recently led many people educated in "White" (French language) schools to subscribe to various forms of continuing education in Islamic studies. More generally, I explore the rise of the French-speaking Islamic elite in Burkina Faso since the 90's, a group that clearly seeks to occupy the public sphere in ways similar to their counterparts in Arab countries. This French-speaking elite has been able to take substantial control over the media (radio, press, Internet) thereby influencing religious practices and dictating Islamic norms. In doing so, they take part actively in the construction of a religious public sphere in Burkina Faso and address social questions of interest for public authorities and for international organizations alike.
Dans un pays où islamisation et réislamisation sont les deux facettes d'un même phénomène, quelles logiques poussent les croyants à reconsidérer leur rapport quotidien à la religion ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous appréhendons l'usage du paradis et du salut dans les discours des élites autant que dans les conceptions des fidèles. Cet article vise à mettre en regard les dimensions publiques du réveil religieux et ses effets sur la vie privée des croyants. Si l'évocation du Jugement dernier est un lieu commun des discours religieux, il convient néanmoins de s'interroger sur son caractère performatif. L'issue du Jugement dernier constitue-t-elle réellement un moteur qui ravive la foi, motive les « bonnes » actions et transforme le rapport intime que les croyants ont à leur religion ?
Depuis plus d'un demi-siècle, on assiste en Afrique de l'Ouest à l'émergence de mouvements dénommés selon les lieux par les termes de « wahhabites », « salafistes » ou encore « isâlistes ». Ces mouvements se distinguaient autrefois par leur lecture littéraliste des textes islamiques, leur tendance à prôner un retour aux sources et une purification des mœurs qui se marque dans les corps par la prière les bras croisés, le port de la barbe pour les hommes, la robe noire et le voile intégral pour les femmes, le refus des cérémonies ostentatoires et une critique de l'islam anciennement implanté d'influence soufie. Si leur implantation a souvent donné lieu à des conflits violents, cinquante ans après, on constate que leur conception de l'islam fait l'objet d'une relative banalisation dans les discours publics des élites islamiques. À travers un cas burkinabé, cet article décrit comment en dépit de son hétérogénéité, la sphère islamique arbore un langage qui homogénéise le discours « islamiquement correct » et les pratiques. Ceci conduit à une sorte de consensus autour de certains discours et marqueurs autrefois référés aux communautés wahhabites. Ce phénomène, symptomatique de la ville, conduit à faire l'hypothèse que le réformisme de type wahhabite s'est transformé progressivement en un réformisme que l'on peut qualifier de « générique ».
Au Burkina Faso, parmi la multiplicité des instances informelles de règlement des conflits, les espaces islamiques de conciliation occupent une place non négligeable et paradoxalement peu visible. Cet article examine les formes de justice islamique pratiquées dans un pays où l'islam est pluriel. Il montre que les autorités islamiques en charge de la résolution des conflits de famille font preuve d'une grande capacité à conjuguer les normes islamiques avec les pratiques locales et les demandes des justiciables. Ainsi, dans les milieux ruraux soufis, la notion appelée sulufu exprime la nécessité de privilégier le principe de conciliation à l'amiable en s'écartant des lectures littéralistes du Coran. En ville, cette importance donnée à l' « arrangement » constitue un frein pour les couples souhaitant divorcer. En effet, les élites islamiques s'accordent pour reconnaître que le droit islamique autorise le divorce, tant pour les hommes que pour les femmes, mais dans les faits, elles se refusent à le cautionner. Ceci révèle la force de l'injonction sociale quant au mariage et à la pérennité du couple.
Cet article montre que, dans des recherches anthropologiques conduites en Afrique subsaharienne, le « genre » constitue une entrée fructueuse pour lire des phénomènes liant politique et islam. Dans cette perspective, le genre, et notamment la conjugalité, ne représentent pas une thématique à part entière mais plutôt un angle de vue idéal pour comprendre l'implication des élites islamiques dans les politiques publiques dites de promotion féminine au Burkina Faso. Nous présentons le contexte d'émergence du féminisme islamique au Burkina Faso et nous analysons ensuite ses traductions dans le quotidien des militantes acquises à cette cause. Nous proposons enfin quelques pistes de réflexion méthodologiques et analytiques permettant de dégager une posture de recherche nécessaire dès lors que l'on se porte sur ce type de « terrain sensible ».
This article explores Ahmadiyya proselytism taking place by way of the mass media. Ahmadiyya is an Islamic organization native to Pakistan that was officially established in Burkina Faso in 1986. Since the 2000s, it has developed rather considerably thanks to its social and humanitarian activities. As a group, it distinguishes itself by its ostentatious occupation of the public sphere, in particular the media, openly confronting other local Islamic groups who, for their part, warn their followers against the Ahmadiyya, judging it to be a dogmatic interpretation of Islam. Regularly criticized, Ahmadiyya recently decided to become the aggressor. In 2002, it inaugurated the Islamic radio Ahmadiyya to Bobo Dioulasso, the first Muslim radio in the country. In addition to its objectives of proselytism and the transmission of the Ahmadi dogma, its aim here is clearly to use the radio to answer attacks against the community. Since, Ahmadiyya has created three other radios in the country along with a network of journalists. In the face of this radio offensive, the other Islamic groups, in particular the Sunnite movement, have opened confessional radios in order to counter-attack. This article will analyze the "media war" between Ahmadiyya and these other Burkinabè Islamic organizations.
In the context of the increased visibility achieved by Islam since the 1990s, this article examines certain types of identity strategies by studying the social uses of radio made by Muslim preachers. Firstly, we show how these preachers claimed more clearly their place in the public sphere, while still opting for conciliatory positions vis-a-vis the authorities. Secondly, by broadcasting their message over the airways they were able to better control that same message. Furthermore, the latter's transmission through the media reflected a certain legitimacy the preachers gained within the Muslim community. The effects of this were twofold : the reconfiguration of the contours of the Muslim community with the arrival of new and highly religious actors and the emerging competition between certain approaches. Finally, as preachers turned to broadcast media, there emerged hybrid strategies at the intersection of the individualization of religious feeling and the feeling of belonging to a religious community. This hybridity was all the more pronounced in the two cities discussed in this article, where the Islamic dynamic was relatively new and where Muslims had lived for decades in a marginal situation (in both countries), sometimes even suffering outright stimatization (in the case of Côte d'Ivoire).
In Western Burkina-Faso, some twenty ethnic groups intertwine in such a way that in some villages two or three ethnic groups can be found together. Nowadays, with the arrival of new migrants in cotton growing areas, more than ten different ethnic groups can be found in big villages. However, in spite of this ethnic rainbow, toponomy demonstrates a strong jula influence. The author tries to explain this toponymy through historical factors.
Les récits écrits de pèlerinage sont très estimés dans la littérature musulmane. En Haute-Volta/Burkina Faso, l'auteur n'a pas trouvé de documents de ce genre. Il a fallu avoir recours aux musulmans eux-mêmes. Ainsi de nombreux entretiens ont été menés pendant dix ans, de 1973 à 1983, à propos du pèlerinage de la Mecque. Cet article est consacré à l'étude de cent quinze personnes qui sont allées à la Mecque par la route, soit un parcours de 14 à 15.000 km aller et retour. Sont examinés le mode de déplacement (de 1905/1910 à 1974), l'identité ethnique des pèlerins, leur appartenance confrérique, et leur motivation. L'auteur n'a pas interrogé tous les pèlerins originaires des régions voltaïques ayant parcouru le trajet par voie de surface, mais elle a essayé de toucher le plus grand nombre possible. Les premiers d'entre eux avaient pris le 'chemin de la Mecque' entre les années 1905 et 1910.
La proximité de pays étrangers a fait de la région de Bawku au Ghana une zone propice aux échanges d'idées, de techniques, de produits. On y voit coexister plusieurs religions, et, pour ce qui est de l'islam, plusieurs tendances comme des sunnites, des adeptes de la confrérie tidjane, mais aussi des Wahhabites. L'auteur a cherché à comprendre comment s'est propagé l'islam dans la région de Bawku, où vit un rameau de la famille maraboutique, et à quel point l'enseignement coranique a été un agent important à cet égard. L'étude est fondée sur les données d'enquêtes de terrain menées sur place et d'entretiens avec des musulmans appartenant à la plupart des groupes de population présents dans la ville, dont des descendants des premiers enseignants venus au cours de la période coloniale. Elle évoque les liens entre le Ghana et la Haute-Volta d'alors (Burkina Faso). L'auteur a observé l'évolution de l'instruction musulmane de chaque côté de la frontière et les répercussions survenues à Bawku après l'indépendance (1957), quand une certaine orientation politique, au Ghana puis au Burkina Faso, a favorisé la modernisation des méthodes pédagogiques et des enseignements.
Since the pre-colonial period, socio-historical conditions have led to the political subordination and the social marginalization of Islam. With the arrival of Blaise Compaoré to power, a logic of inclusion of formerly marginalized actors, including those of the Islamic milieu, is established. However, despite this policy being introduced in a context of religious revival, Islam only partially succeeds in liberating itself, as shown by the analysis of the Muslims religious authorities and economic operators' status in the semi-authoritarian regime of the 4th Republic.
Whilst religious radicalism is at the heart of media and scientific preoccupations, this study shows that, in Burkina Faso, Muslim authority has experienced a steady regression in the urban environment of Ouagadougou. On the basis of interviews conducted with young Muslims at the University of Ouagadougou, the article proposes a reflection on the factors that are causing such an erosion of authority. If the spiritual dimension of this authority is not being called into question, the temporal dimension is undergoing a process of de-legitimisation, which is increasing in line with the interpenetration of the religious and political spheres as well as the discrediting of the semi-authoritarian regime of Blaise Compaoré. In addition to highlighting the fragmentation of the sectors of authority, the study allows for better identification of the position of youths ("cadets sociaux") in the religious field.
This article offers a definition of the concept of moral economy, first in the general framework of the existing literature, and then in the more specific case of Burkinabè Islam. It then examines the relationship between moral economy and the charismatic figures of Islam in Burkina Faso. The example of two religious leaders (sheiks) in two different contexts, urban and rural, offers examples of how these charismatic authorities manage the economic assets entrusted to them by the faithful in the interests of the community. The article also aims to shed greater light on the strategies adopted by these "social planners" to mobilize and invest the resources generated by migratory flows.
In recent years, Muslim associations in Burkina Faso have undergone a major transformation, driven by the development of the transnational dimension of Islam and a more direct involvement of this religion in the socio-political life of the country. In this article, through the description and analysis of three different Islamic associations, we will try to understand the deep reasons of such evolution, and study the strategies put in place by the religious authorities in order to restructure their zawiyas and reposition them in the public sphere. In this framework, we will also describe the personal trajectory of some religious leaders and propose a possible classification of the aforementioned associations.
Darsalamy is one of the few places in Burkina Faso that were intentionally founded by and for Muslims who wanted to keep a distance from non-Muslims and from practices considered as pagan. Jula Muslims who left Bobo-Dioulasso at the end of the 19th century in order to found Darsalamy wanted to inhabit a place that was not "contaminated" by non-Muslim ways of life such as mask dances. This emigration coincided with the events that shook the entire region: the jihad of Umar Tall, the wars of Samori Touré and the arrival of the Europeans. These events changed the relationship between Muslim scholars, their allies and protectors and the local elites of Bobo-Dioulasso.
On his way back from his first travels to the interior of the Gambia, Mungo Park describes a ‘schoolmaster' who entertained him in the Mandingo country while his principal host was on a slave purchasing expedition. The school of this master consisted of seventeen boys who ‘always had their lessons by the light of a large fire before daybreak and again late in the evening' and who ‘were employed in planting corn, bringing firewood, and in other servile offices, through the day' (Park, 1799: 313–14). Such rural institutions combining elementary Islamic education and farm production must then have existed in the coastal areas of West Africa for at least two centuries, and spread to other parts of Africa as a result of Islamic expansion. They were agents of proselytization and further Islamization. Consequently Quranic schools are often discussed primarily in their relation to Islamic history. In the present day, however, they continue in some areas as viable alternatives to western-style schools and as units of agricultural production. This paper, which stems from research I conducted in the southern part of central Upper Volta on household farms and wealth stratification, underscores the dual function of these farm schools.
