La question des jeunes est un élément essentiel pour comprendre les dynamiques de l'espace public et les pratiques citoyennes qui émergent dans l'Afrique d'aujourd'hui. Leur importance tient non seulement à leur poids démographique imposant, mais aussi à leur transformation, souvent dramatique, en tant qu'acteurs sociaux dans l'espace public africain au cours des années 1990. Cette transformation encourage la création de nouvelles formes de légitimité et de nouveaux espaces d'expression individuelle ou collective, et correspond à une mutation radicale de l'idée de citoyenneté, qui fait appel à de nouvelles ressources et qui remodèle les dynamiques nationales d'inclusion et d'exclusion. Ainsi, la constitution de nouveaux espaces d'expression encourage une conception moins restrictive de la participation citoyenne dans la mesure où les jeunes veulent faire entendre leur opinion et participer ouvertement aux divers débats de société. En lien avec les concepts de « citoyenneté culturelle » et de « contre-nation », nous nous proposons dans cet article d'examiner le rôle des jeunes dans le contexte de réaffirmation de l'identité islamique qui a marqué l'Afrique de l'Ouest francophone à partir des années 1980 et plus encore dans les années 1990, particulièrement dans les grands centres urbains du Sénégal, du Mali, du Burkina Faso et de la Côte d'Ivoire. Nous nous penchons plus spécifiquement sur la question du rapport entre jeunes (comme catégorie sociale), religion et espace public.
Under what conditions does religion become a salient social identity? By measuring religious attachment among the people living astride the Burkina Faso–Côte d'Ivoire border in West Africa, an arbitrary boundary that exposes otherwise similar individuals to different political contexts, this article makes a case for the importance of the political environment in affecting the weight that people attach to their religious identities. After ruling out explanations rooted in the proportion of different religious denominations, the degree of secularization and the supply of religious institutions on either side of the border, as well as differences in the degree of religious pluralism at the national level, it highlights the greater exposure of Ivorian respondents to the politicization of religion during Côte d'Ivoire's recent civil conflict. Methodologically, the study demonstrates the power – and challenges – of exploiting Africa's arbitrary borders as a source of causal leverage.
In Burkina Faso, for many populations, the birth of twins obligate their mother to a ritual of presentation of the children, in which people give them some offerings. The aim of this paper is to discuss the way the practice has evolved in a begging of mothers of twins around mosques in urban contexts. Ouagadougou was the fieldwork for our observations of begging places. The results show how women give priority to mosques as a destination of their mobility, linked with a begging that doesn't depend on religious practices but that reshapes the moral economy of the gift at a local level.
Since last year, jihadi attacks in northern Burkina Faso have been steadily on the rise. These have largely been attributable to a newly established but understudied jihadi group, Ansaroul Islam, which has its roots in the ongoing insurgency in Mali and is linked to al-Qa`ida's network in the Sahel. Its budding insurgency greatly threatens the security of Burkina Faso and neighboring countries. State responses to the violence have been heavy-handed, which only furthers the cause of Ansaroul Islam.
The situation of Islam in Upper Volta is ambiguous: while dominant in numbers it remains in a subordinate position in the polity. Within the contemporary context of Moslem political awakening, peaceful Voltaic Islam looks like an oddity, whose origins lie in the history of Islamization. In the Mosi kingdoms Moslems occupied a marginal position and the vectors of Islamization were extraneous. Despite their role in the royal courts, Moslems were accepted only on tolerance and the political System was free of Islamic influence. While the colonial System did not bring any deep change in this status, the disruption of traditional structures accelerated the rate of conversions. Nevertheless, due to its divisions and to its inability to cope with modernization, Voltaic Islam has been unable to produce a political elite which could have claimed leadership in the post-colonial State or put forth a social design of its own. Islam remained thus exposed to the most various ideological, religious and secular influences, which perpetuated its subordinate position. This led to the 1983 crisis in the Communaute musulmane de Haute-Volta, the most serious since the creation of this important Islamic association.
In the early 1980s Burkina Faso experienced an Islamic resurgence which coincided with the advent of a "democratic and popular revolution", heralding a programme of authoritarian modernization, transforming civil society and incorporating it into the state sphere. In this context came profound and sometimes brutal changes; for Muslims, Islam was an instrument to rebuild their identity and preserve their autonomy as a community, in the face of heavier and heavier-handed state domination. However, this awakening has not necessarily expressed a rejection of the state; on the contrary, in certain cases it articulates the desire for inclusion in the centre of the revolutionary process.
The mosque, a place of worship for Muslims, started in Medina, Saudi Arabia. Then it became widespread around the world : Asia, Africa, Europe and America…..Its architecture was influenced by the different cultures, organization and religions of the people who adopted it. In Burkina Faso as well as in other countries, the mosque came with Islam. As far as Moogo is concerned Islam was introduced by the Yarce, Silmi – Moose (Fulani- Moose) and Fulani. The building of a mosque was thus related to several aspects : landowner and traditional chief's authorization as well as colonial and / or national administration permission. In Ouagadougou, several types of mosque exist, the architectural style is determined by the means the Muslims have when they decide to build. The mosque is managed by several persons : The Imam, the Muezzin, the caretakers and the treasurer, etc. Initially, the mosque was made for religious practice, but now it plays an educational, social and economic role in society.
Arab and Islamic culture is made available to students in several venues. In the Soaw district, there are, on the one hand, the Coranic school which was introduced back in the 16th century by Yarse Muslims, and, on the other hand, the medersa which was founded as late as 2001. Both systems teach Arab and Islamic culture. The difference between the two, however, is that the objective of the former is not to teach Arabic, but to transmit religious knowledge; it does not help learners to find jobs after the completion of their studies. The medersa, on the other hand, teaches how to read and write Arabic with a view to engage in a professional activity. In other words, the Coranic school teaches only religion, and Arabic is translated into and explained in the vernacular teaching language. The medersa teaches religion, Arabic, French and a number of scientific disciplines, which are explained either in Arabic or in French.
Burkina Faso is ranked among "low human development" countries (UNPD) whereas it comes first for cotton production in Africa. For ten centuries until the colonial period, cotton growing and cotton transformation were closely linked, contributing to the regional and continental development. In fact, cotton was in the heart of a political, economic and religious system brought by muslim worshipers and muslim traders coming from North of Africa. This muslim history appeared by focusing on the most productive cotton area of the country, the area of Bwamu, proving that it was involved in a continental historical process. Historical ties were revealed by building the monographs of five villages. They proved that bwa people was connected to muslim political entities and muslim historical figures.
In the village of Todiam, persons accused of a fault come by far to take an oath in the mosque. This ordalic procedure utilizes actors, codes and principles which invite to analyze this oath by regarding it as a /test/ in the sense of pragmatic sociology. From this point of view, and by confronting the speeches to the practice, one questions the conditions of legitimacy and effectiveness of this juratory test, its possible misappropriations and its performatif effects on the social life.
In this paper I examine the re-Islamisation of French-speaking Muslims in Burkina Faso. Grounded in direct observation carried out with a group involved in Islamic evening classes, my analysis interrogates the logics which have recently led many people educated in "White" (French language) schools to subscribe to various forms of continuing education in Islamic studies. More generally, I explore the rise of the French-speaking Islamic elite in Burkina Faso since the 90's, a group that clearly seeks to occupy the public sphere in ways similar to their counterparts in Arab countries. This French-speaking elite has been able to take substantial control over the media (radio, press, Internet) thereby influencing religious practices and dictating Islamic norms. In doing so, they take part actively in the construction of a religious public sphere in Burkina Faso and address social questions of interest for public authorities and for international organizations alike.
Dans un pays où islamisation et réislamisation sont les deux facettes d'un même phénomène, quelles logiques poussent les croyants à reconsidérer leur rapport quotidien à la religion ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous appréhendons l'usage du paradis et du salut dans les discours des élites autant que dans les conceptions des fidèles. Cet article vise à mettre en regard les dimensions publiques du réveil religieux et ses effets sur la vie privée des croyants. Si l'évocation du Jugement dernier est un lieu commun des discours religieux, il convient néanmoins de s'interroger sur son caractère performatif. L'issue du Jugement dernier constitue-t-elle réellement un moteur qui ravive la foi, motive les « bonnes » actions et transforme le rapport intime que les croyants ont à leur religion ?
Depuis plus d'un demi-siècle, on assiste en Afrique de l'Ouest à l'émergence de mouvements dénommés selon les lieux par les termes de « wahhabites », « salafistes » ou encore « isâlistes ». Ces mouvements se distinguaient autrefois par leur lecture littéraliste des textes islamiques, leur tendance à prôner un retour aux sources et une purification des mœurs qui se marque dans les corps par la prière les bras croisés, le port de la barbe pour les hommes, la robe noire et le voile intégral pour les femmes, le refus des cérémonies ostentatoires et une critique de l'islam anciennement implanté d'influence soufie. Si leur implantation a souvent donné lieu à des conflits violents, cinquante ans après, on constate que leur conception de l'islam fait l'objet d'une relative banalisation dans les discours publics des élites islamiques. À travers un cas burkinabé, cet article décrit comment en dépit de son hétérogénéité, la sphère islamique arbore un langage qui homogénéise le discours « islamiquement correct » et les pratiques. Ceci conduit à une sorte de consensus autour de certains discours et marqueurs autrefois référés aux communautés wahhabites. Ce phénomène, symptomatique de la ville, conduit à faire l'hypothèse que le réformisme de type wahhabite s'est transformé progressivement en un réformisme que l'on peut qualifier de « générique ».
Au Burkina Faso, parmi la multiplicité des instances informelles de règlement des conflits, les espaces islamiques de conciliation occupent une place non négligeable et paradoxalement peu visible. Cet article examine les formes de justice islamique pratiquées dans un pays où l'islam est pluriel. Il montre que les autorités islamiques en charge de la résolution des conflits de famille font preuve d'une grande capacité à conjuguer les normes islamiques avec les pratiques locales et les demandes des justiciables. Ainsi, dans les milieux ruraux soufis, la notion appelée sulufu exprime la nécessité de privilégier le principe de conciliation à l'amiable en s'écartant des lectures littéralistes du Coran. En ville, cette importance donnée à l' « arrangement » constitue un frein pour les couples souhaitant divorcer. En effet, les élites islamiques s'accordent pour reconnaître que le droit islamique autorise le divorce, tant pour les hommes que pour les femmes, mais dans les faits, elles se refusent à le cautionner. Ceci révèle la force de l'injonction sociale quant au mariage et à la pérennité du couple.
Cet article montre que, dans des recherches anthropologiques conduites en Afrique subsaharienne, le « genre » constitue une entrée fructueuse pour lire des phénomènes liant politique et islam. Dans cette perspective, le genre, et notamment la conjugalité, ne représentent pas une thématique à part entière mais plutôt un angle de vue idéal pour comprendre l'implication des élites islamiques dans les politiques publiques dites de promotion féminine au Burkina Faso. Nous présentons le contexte d'émergence du féminisme islamique au Burkina Faso et nous analysons ensuite ses traductions dans le quotidien des militantes acquises à cette cause. Nous proposons enfin quelques pistes de réflexion méthodologiques et analytiques permettant de dégager une posture de recherche nécessaire dès lors que l'on se porte sur ce type de « terrain sensible ».
This article explores Ahmadiyya proselytism taking place by way of the mass media. Ahmadiyya is an Islamic organization native to Pakistan that was officially established in Burkina Faso in 1986. Since the 2000s, it has developed rather considerably thanks to its social and humanitarian activities. As a group, it distinguishes itself by its ostentatious occupation of the public sphere, in particular the media, openly confronting other local Islamic groups who, for their part, warn their followers against the Ahmadiyya, judging it to be a dogmatic interpretation of Islam. Regularly criticized, Ahmadiyya recently decided to become the aggressor. In 2002, it inaugurated the Islamic radio Ahmadiyya to Bobo Dioulasso, the first Muslim radio in the country. In addition to its objectives of proselytism and the transmission of the Ahmadi dogma, its aim here is clearly to use the radio to answer attacks against the community. Since, Ahmadiyya has created three other radios in the country along with a network of journalists. In the face of this radio offensive, the other Islamic groups, in particular the Sunnite movement, have opened confessional radios in order to counter-attack. This article will analyze the "media war" between Ahmadiyya and these other Burkinabè Islamic organizations.
In the context of the increased visibility achieved by Islam since the 1990s, this article examines certain types of identity strategies by studying the social uses of radio made by Muslim preachers. Firstly, we show how these preachers claimed more clearly their place in the public sphere, while still opting for conciliatory positions vis-a-vis the authorities. Secondly, by broadcasting their message over the airways they were able to better control that same message. Furthermore, the latter's transmission through the media reflected a certain legitimacy the preachers gained within the Muslim community. The effects of this were twofold : the reconfiguration of the contours of the Muslim community with the arrival of new and highly religious actors and the emerging competition between certain approaches. Finally, as preachers turned to broadcast media, there emerged hybrid strategies at the intersection of the individualization of religious feeling and the feeling of belonging to a religious community. This hybridity was all the more pronounced in the two cities discussed in this article, where the Islamic dynamic was relatively new and where Muslims had lived for decades in a marginal situation (in both countries), sometimes even suffering outright stimatization (in the case of Côte d'Ivoire).
In Western Burkina-Faso, some twenty ethnic groups intertwine in such a way that in some villages two or three ethnic groups can be found together. Nowadays, with the arrival of new migrants in cotton growing areas, more than ten different ethnic groups can be found in big villages. However, in spite of this ethnic rainbow, toponomy demonstrates a strong jula influence. The author tries to explain this toponymy through historical factors.
