Attacks on the Burkina Faso army headquarters and the French Embassy on 2 March 2018 were better organised, involved heavier weapons and were more sustained than anything seen so far in Burkina Faso. In this Q&A, our West Africa Program Director Rinaldo Depagne says the jihadist assault further exposes worrying weakness in the Burkinabé security forces.
In a troubled region, Burkina Faso is a rare example of religious diversity and tolerance. But a perceived discrepancy between a significant number of Muslims and their low level of public representation has created tensions. To safeguard Burkina's model of peaceful coexistence, the government must address this sensitive issue through careful reforms, particularly in the education system.
Jihadist violence in the West African Sahel has now spread to the north of Burkina Faso. The response of Ouagadougou and its partners must go beyond the obvious religious and security dimensions of the crisis, and any solution must take into account deep-rooted social and local factors.
The Global Center on Cooperative Security is pleased to announce the publication of the report, "Preventing Violent Extremism in Burkina Faso: Toward National Resilience Amid Regional Insecurity." The report is coauthored by Profs. Augustin Loada (Executive Director of the Ouagadougou-based Centre pour la Gouvernance Democratique) and Peter Romaniuk (Senior Fellow at the Global Center in New York). At a time when violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel is at the top of the regional and international agenda, the report assesses the threat to Burkina Faso and surveys sources of resilience. The report finds that Burkina Faso is vulnerable to violent extremism but the threat is not imminent, while arguing that stakeholders (the Government of Burkina Faso, its international partners and civil society groups) should take steps to prevent the emergence of violent extremism and build resilience.
The report was formally launched on Thursday 12 June at the United Nations in New York at a side event during the biannual review of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy. Speakers at the event included H.E. Dr. Jerôme Bougouma (Minister of Territorial Administration and Security, Government of Burkina Faso), H.E. Mr. Ib Petersen (Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN), Mr. Jehangir Khan (Director, UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force) and Prof. Loada. The report follows the publication by the Global Center in 2012 of "Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community Engagement in West Africa and the Sahel: An Action Agenda." The report was supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
It can be observed that jihadist groups in West Africa are increasingly expanding their areas of activity from the Sahel to the coastal countries along the Gulf of Guinea for some time now. Especially from Burkina Faso, where entire regions are already outside state control, these actors are advancing further and further south.
This current development is the focus of the new study "La nouvelle frontière des groupes djihadistes", which the KAS Regional Programme Political Dialogue West Africa (PDWA) has implemented together with partner Promédiation. One of the study's key topics is the importance of national parks in border regions, which are increasingly used by jihadist groups as strategic retreat and activity areas and whose local resources are used for financing.
This report by guest contributor Dr. Leif Brottem uses ACLED data and primary information collected by Dr. Brottem and his team during research in northern Benin.
Les autorités du Bénin et du Togo doivent veiller à ce que les droits humains soient respectés dans le cadre de la lutte contre les groupes armés, a déclaré Amnesty International le 27 juillet alors que des informations font état d’arrestations et détentions arbitraires et de violations des droits à la liberté de réunion pacifique et d’expression, et alors que le président Emmanuel Macron effectue une visite au Bénin les 27 et 28 juillet 2022.
À la suite de deux coups d’État militaires en 2022, les groupes islamistes militants ont encerclé Ouagadougou, laissant dans leur sillage une violence sans précédent.
Editor’s Note: The following is an excerpt adapted from a forthcoming report by USIP’s Senior Study Group on Coastal West Africa. The report presents the recommendations of that study group, which consisted of current and former policymakers, prominent political scientists and economists, representatives of international organizations, and business leaders.
Depuis 2021, les forces béninoises ont enregistré une vingtaine d’incursions djihadistes, venant de la partie partie frontalière du Burkina Faso, pays très touché par les attaques. Cela montre l’urgence face à la menace persistante du djihadisme dans la sous-région.
Timbuktu Institute a procédé ce jeudi 16 juin à la restitution d'une étude régionale sur "Islam et islamisme en Afrique de l'Ouest" en partenariat avec l'Académie Internationale de Lutte contre le terrorisme (AILCT) basée à Abidjan.
The jihadist groups that have laid waste to the Sahel over the past decade are creeping along the southern borders of Mali and Burkina Faso. How far south will they go? Without making a moral equivalence between the past and the present, this short essay discusses how historical, cultural and political factors could shape the new geography of armed conflict in the region. It suggests that the southern expansion of jihadist groups will ultimately depend on the timely and appropriate set of initiatives taken by coastal countries.
Since February this year, a new battlefront has emerged in eastern Burkina Faso (ACLED, 2018), in the Est Region situated along the borders with Niger, Benin, and Togo is regarded as a bastion of banditry. However, militancy is a new phenomenon in this part of the country, except the reported failed attempt by Al-Mourabitoun to establish a base in the Tapoa Forest, albeit on the Nigerien side of the border (Jeune Afrique, 2016). Until recently, militancy was largely limited to the country’s northern provinces along the border with Mali, in addition to a series of high-profile attacks in the capital of Ouagadougou (ACLED, 2018).
This is a joint report produced by the Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael - the Netherlands Institute of International Relations in partnership with the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).
For many years analysts have warned against the risk of spill over of violence from the Sahel into the littoral states. Recently, Bernard Émié, the French head of the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) for example singled out Benin and Côte d’Ivoire as being at imminent danger.
Yet the fear of violent contagion to coastal West Africa is so far mostly based on repeating a handful of violent incidents: the 2020 Kafolo attack and the 2016 Grand Bassam attack (both in Côte d’Ivoire); the 2019 Pendjari attack in Benin; sightings of Violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and roaming preachers.
We know, however, that VEOs expand by building local alliance and exploit existing communal conflict. This report explores local problems in one country possibly at risk: Benin, specifically the Northern regions of Alibori, Borgou and Atacora. Data collected for this project with the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) reveals various open communal conflicts in Benin’s north that have become intense and lethal.
The analysis observes the presence of five separate cells in the border areas of northern Benin but concludes that as of yet there is no clear alignments between communal violence and VEOs. But there are worrying developments as VEO activity is increasing in Alibori and Atacora. The window to act seems to be closing.
The Potential for Radicalization and Political Violence in West Africa
Crises in the Sahel (from Mali to southern Tunisia and Libya) and the regionalization of Boko Haram’s activities as far as the Lake Chad basin (Niger, Cameroon and Chad) are some of today’s worrying signals related to West African stability.
The question of a potential broadening of this ‘arc of crisis’ to stable countries in the region, including Benin and Ghana, motivated research in the field conducted by the Clingendael Institute. In Accra and Tamale in Ghana, and in Cotonou and Porto-Novo in Benin, the research team looked into religious, historic, political and societal dynamics that may constitute elements of future (in)stability.
New religious “ideologies” (Christian evangelism and/or Sunni revivalism), mixed with economic frustrations, have deeply impacted the traditional balance and make long‑term stability a challenge for most of the countries in the region, from Mali to the Horn of Africa. In this report Clingendael explores the specific ways the Ghanaian and Beninese actors are dealing with politics, identity and societal stress. We also identify the influence of external actors, from both the region and beyond, and potential spill over of nearby conflicts.
Conclusion
Clingendael comes to the conclusion that several issues, like border porosity, absence of a regional strategic approach to counter terrorism, youth frustration towards the elder’s political and economic monopoly, rural and urban disparities and rampant illiteracy are some of the regional aggravating factors that are conducive to the spread of extremist ideology and dividing behaviours. Our report can be considered as an early warning. What is urgently needed is early action.
In 2021, the United Nations noted the newfound threats of the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), a branch of al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), that extended into Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast, stretching farther yet into Ghana, Togo, and Benin. Had an observer in 2006 had this information presented to them, they might have scarcely believed it. That year, in which AQIM was formed, the group was a thoroughly North African organization and based primarily in Algeria. Fast forward 15 years, how did AQIM end up nearly 1,300 miles away, now posing immediate threats in the states of littoral West Africa?
Relying on a combination of primary source jihadi propaganda and historical research, this report argues that over the past 30 years, al-Qa`ida and its branches and allies in North and West Africa have followed what this report calls “al- Qa`ida's Imperial Playbook,” as they have sought to expand their areas of influence southward. Al-Qa`ida's “playbook,” this report shows, is composed of five fundamental tactics: befriending or creating militant groups operating in the midst of conflict; integrating themselves into communities where those militants exist; exploiting grievances of those communities to gain sympathy; addressing internal or external dissent either passively or aggressively; and looking toward new theaters once their base is solidified. Al-Qa`ida has subsequently utilized this playbook to expand southward from its Algeria base in five distinct historical periods: from 1992- 1998; 1998-2006; 2006-2012; 2013-2017; and 2017-present. The report concludes that al-Qa`ida and its affiliates in northern and western Africa are likely to continue to use this playbook as they continue their contemporary expansion into West Africa.
La situation sécuritaire dans le Sahel central est à ce point dégradée que la menace djihadiste déborde désormais sur la partie nord des pays côtiers d'Afrique de l'Ouest. Les régions de l'Est et des Cascades au Burkina Faso ou celles de Sikasso et de Kayes au Mali constituent des bases arrière permettant aux groupes djihadistes – et principalement à la Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) pour l'instant – de s'étendre au Bénin, en Côte d'Ivoire, et dans une moindre mesure au Togo, au Ghana, au Sénégal et en Guinée. Cette excroissance territoriale djihadiste va progressivement donner naissance à des foyers djihadistes de plus en plus endogènes dans ces États, composés de recrues locales et qui se nourrissent des fragilités propres aux territoires où ils se développent : tensions d'accès aux ressources, stigmatisation communautaire potentiellement exacerbée par des groupes d'autodéfense, existence de réseaux criminels prompts à se « djihadiser ». La propagation de l'idéologie djihadiste depuis le Sahel central au-delà des frontières sud constitue le moteur permettant d'exploiter et de transformer les frustrations et les injustices qui découlent de ces situations de fragilité. Comme au Sahel central où les autorités ont pris trop tardivement conscience de cette réalité. Pour les pays côtiers d'Afrique de l'Ouest, où la menace reste encore contenue en intensité et limitée géographiquement, il est encore temps de prévenir une dégradation de la situation sécuritaire. Pour cela, les autorités de ces États doivent aligner des réponses civiles et militaires qui soient adaptées à la nature de la menace et qui réduisent de façon radicale l'ampleur de ces fragilités.
La détérioration de la situation sécuritaire au Burkina Faso, qui a suivi la chute du président Blaise Compaoré en octobre 2014, laissait craindre une diffusion du djihadisme à la Côte d’Ivoire, au Ghana, au Bénin et au Togo. Ces pays côtiers du golfe de Guinée, qui furent longtemps épargnés par cette menace – à l’exception de l’attentat de Grand-Bassam en Côte d’Ivoire en mars 2016 – ont été la cible d’attaques dans les zones frontalières avec le Burkina Faso et le Niger au cours des dernières années. Ce texte souhaite aller au-delà d’une perspective strictement sécuritaire sur le Bénin et le Togo en se penchant plutôt, d’une part, sur les répercussions de la lutte contre le terrorisme sur la démocratie et, d’autre part, sur les conséquences de la sécuritisation de l’islam et plus particulièrement du salafisme – surtout présent au Togo – sur les minorités musulmanes des deux pays. Des leaders politiques et même musulmans ont en effet présenté l’islam radical et en l’occurrence le salafisme comme un enjeu de sécurité et une menace pour la cohabitation religieuse.
The spiral of violence in the Sahel is threatening to engulf the biosphere reserve in the cross-border territory shared by Burkina Faso, Benin and Niger. The rising violence is causing massive displacement and all three countries should respond jointly by mobilising and coordinating state armed forces to protect affected populations. But a joint military response is not enough. The three states should also collaborate to address the root causes of the insecurity: the land and pastoralism crisis; inconsistency in the distribution of forest resources; and a poorly integrated approach to managing the biosphere reserve.
Elva Community Engagement is proud to share its latest research: An Assessment of the Experiences and Vulnerabilities of Pastoralists and At-Risk Groups in the Atakora Department of Benin. This research was conducted under USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives’ Coastal West Africa Regional Initiative program. It brings together findings from over 190 key informant interviews and 270 focus group participants in northwest Benin, that examined the vulnerabilities of particular groups as they experience violent extremist organization (VEO) influence. Building on Elva’s previous research in Coastal West Africa and the Sahel, this report illustrates how violent extremism in Benin is now increasingly homegrown.
The West Africa al-Qaeda alliance, known as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has deployed a dynamic recruitment and influence strategy in northwest Benin. The research found that pastoralists, unemployed youth, and migrants, figured prominently among the groups in the Atakora department that are at-risk of being targeted by VEO recruitment efforts. VEO propaganda is deliberately leveraging the local discontent created by Benin’s recent policy reforms to modernize its agro-pastoral industry and conserve the fragile ecosystem of the Park W-Arly-Pendjari complex.
Economic development policies that seek to formalize crucial sectors of the economy like commercial agriculture and livestock production, in some cases unintentionally impact livelihoods of some of the most vulnerable groups. These reforms can increase competition over already scarce resources, and sometimes can exacerbate intercommunal tensions and escalate into violence. Increased local tensions are creating more opportunities for non-state actors, particularly VEOs, to exploit vulnerabilities, through circulating dis-/misinformation and the provision of alternative economic livelihoods.
Nonetheless, the war against VEOs is by no means lost. Now is the time for thoughtful adaptation of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) responses in Atakora, and this research identified several recommendations that were tailored to the local context, based on needs identified in the primary research.
